Scientific Progress

Table of Contents

1. The Deductive Model
2. The Basis of the Logical Empiricist Conception of Science
3. The Basis of the Popperian Conception of Science
4. The Logical Empiricist Conception of Scientific Progress
5. The Popperian Conception of Scientific Progress
6. Popper, Lakatos, and the Transcendence of the Deductive Model
7. Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Incommensurability
8. The Gestalt Model
9. The Perspectivist Conception of Science
10. Development of the Perspectivist Conception in the Context of the Kinetic Theory of Gases
11. The Set-Theoretic Conception of Science
12. Application of the Perspectivist Conception to the Views of Newton, Kepler and Galileo

Appendices

I. On Theoretical Terms
II. Reply to Criticism of the First Edition
III. Perspectivism and Subatomic Physics
IV. On the Nature of Scientific Laws and Theories
V. Is the Transition from Absolute to Relative Space a Shift of Conceptual Perspective?
VI. Two Perspectives on Sustainable Development
VI. Modern Science and the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities
VIII. A Theory of Identity and Reference